JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

Status:	Active
Also Known As (AKA):	AJAI (The Congregation of Muslims), Jamaah al-Islamiyyah, JI, Lashkar Mujahideen, Lashkar Jundallah, Tandhin Qaidatulch Jihat
Formed:	1993
Areas of Operation:	Philippines, Afghanistan, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Iraq
Ideology:	Political (Separatist), Religious (Islamist-Wahabbism)
Leader:	Naji Ibrahim
Group Affiliates:	Abu Sayyaf Group, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), Abu Sofia, Al Qaeda, Batalion Abu Bakr, Darul Islam, Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Gerakan Mujahideen, Hukbong Khalid Trinidad (HKT), Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI), Islamic Army in Iraq, Islam Pattani (GMIP), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Komite Penanggulungan Krisis (KOMPAK), Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Let), Laskar Jundallah, Laskar Khos, Laskar Mujahideen, Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Mujahideen KOMPAK, New People's Army (NPA), Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia

ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY

Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is primarily concerned with the notion of Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara, which refers to the establishment of a pan-Islamic republic that incorporates Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Thailand, and the southern Philippines.

The history of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) begins with two key individuals, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Both men got their start as part of an Islamist opposition to Suharto’s rule in Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s.[2] Sungkar was connected to the older Darul Islam movement that is currently active in Indonesia but considered fractionalized. In 1972, Ba’aysir and Sungkar established an Islamic boarding school in Solo known as al Mukmin Pesantren (Pondok Ngruji) that created a network of Islamists that would contribute to the formation of JI years later. Among the important individuals who passed through the doors of al Mukmin were Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali, and Abu Jibril, both of whom also played a role in the formation of JI. Ba’aysir and Sungkar were arrested in 1978 and sentenced to nine years in prison under anti-subversion laws. However, both men served only half of their sentences and fled to Malaysia in the early 1980s, where they served as ideologues for violent Islamists headed for Afghanistan. It was during this phase, when many jihadis were fighting in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet War, and also retreating to Malaysia to escape the wrath of Suharto, that JI was conceived.

Prior to 1993, Ba’aysir and Sungkar instructed their star pupils and deputies, Hambali and Jibril, to establish a network of militants in Southeast Asia.[3] On January 1, 1993, Sungkar officially made the transition of JI from a political organization to a militant, terrorist organization.[4]  Sungkar and Ba’aysir returned to Solo, Indonesia in 1999 after the country’s dictatorship collapsed and democracy was established.[5]  Even though responsible for such major operations as both Bali bombings, and the 2003 Marriott bombing, some authorities suggest that JI is beginning to model itself as a less violent organization.  Regardless, other researchers note that JI no longer has the ability to commit large-scale attacks on legitimate government or civilian targets.  Indonesia and other security forces have conducted effective counterterrorism operations against group leaders, including the captures of JI’s operations chief, Hambali; the chief bomb-maker, Azahari bin Husin; military leader, Zarkasih; military commander, Abu Duhanah; the Singaporean leader, Mas Selamat Kastari; and finally, the death of the Jakarta 2009 bombings mastermind, Noordin M. Top.  Jemaah Islamiya does, however, have the capacity to reassert itself as a formidable threat in the future as young, hard-line Islamists grow into adults and take responsibility for the previous generation’s struggle.

Image depicts the site of the Bali bombing plot, planned and carried out by JI operatives, in October 2002 where 202 people were killed

STRUCTURE

JI divides organizational responsibilities between regions, each composed of various committees and sub-committees.  There are currently four specific territorial cells throughout the region called “Mantiqis” under the control of the Emir (leader) and the Markaz (leadership council).  Each Mantiqi controls a geographic division across Southeast Asia.  Riduan Isamuddin, or Hambali, was allegedly the operations chief for JI, and a senior lieutenant of al-Qaeda, that acted as a point of contact between one or more Mantiqis until his arrest in Thailand in 2003.  The inner core of JI is made up of a very tight-knit group of individuals, most of who fought in the Afghan-Soviet War.

FUNDING

JI manages its own financing wing, ensuring a steady flow of money to support their terrorist activities.  Businesses established by JI operatives are required to contribute 10% of their earnings to the group’s Infaq Fisabilillah (operations fund). Charitable and terrorist organizations have also been linked to JI, including the Medical Emergency Relief Charity, Islamic International Relief Organization, al Haramain, and al Qaeda.  Research shows that in a five year period, al Qaeda donated up to 1.3 billion rupiah (approximately $130,000) to JI. There is anecdotal evidence that JI members abroad are struggling to maintain themselves financially, some becoming more involved in the small arms market in Mindanao to sustain themselves.  Some international criminal enterprises, such as arms trafficking, are popular among JI operatives.  Not only are they able to raise funds from these activities, but it also adds to their arsenal of weapons.  JI has been known to conduct extensive robbery and burglary activities in order to fund their day-to-day activities, in addition to large-scale bombing operations.

RECRUITMENT

The pesantren (religious school), al-Mukmin, is one of the more popular pesantrens where Ba’asyir preached his political radical beliefs. Several Jemaah Islamiya (JI) members and leaders were known to have attended pesantrens within Pondok Ngruki. It is believed that JI will always find recruits through such institutions as Islamic boarding and public schools, prisons, and college campuses.

TACTICS

JI operatives have become notorious for their extensive bombing campaigns against Western targets in Southeast Asia. The bombs produced by JI are designed to cause mass civilian casualties, similar to those of al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups.  Moreover, the group has primarily targeted Americans, other security forces, or civilians in “soft areas” that are difficult to protect, such as nightclubs and hotels, as opposed to more secure installations.  The following three elements have made the group quite successful:  (1) tactics designed for mass casualties; (2) hitting soft targets; (3) and targeting Westerners.  JI also targets police and security forces from both Indonesia, and Australia.

The organization is responsible for several lethal bombing attacks in Indonesia against Western targets, including the Bali nightclub bombing in 2002 which resulted in the deaths of 202 people, the Marriot Hotel bombing in Jakarta in 2003, the vehicle-born IED attack against the Australian embassy in 2004, the string of tourist site bombings in October 2005 in Bali, and the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotel bombings in July 2009 in Jakarta which killed nine people, and injured over 50.