Status:
|
Active
|
Also
Known As (AKA):
|
AJAI
(The Congregation of Muslims), Jamaah al-Islamiyyah, JI, Lashkar Mujahideen,
Lashkar Jundallah, Tandhin Qaidatulch Jihat
|
Formed:
|
1993
|
Areas
of Operation:
|
Philippines,
Afghanistan, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Iraq
|
Ideology:
|
Political
(Separatist), Religious (Islamist-Wahabbism)
|
Leader:
|
Naji
Ibrahim
|
Group
Affiliates:
|
Abu
Sayyaf Group, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), Abu Sofia, Al
Qaeda, Batalion Abu Bakr, Darul Islam, Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Gerakan
Mujahideen, Hukbong Khalid Trinidad (HKT), Indonesian Mujahideen Council
(MMI), Islamic Army in Iraq, Islam Pattani (GMIP), Islamic Defenders Front
(FPI), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Komite Penanggulungan Krisis (KOMPAK),
Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Let), Laskar
Jundallah, Laskar Khos, Laskar Mujahideen, Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia
(MMI), Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Mujahideen KOMPAK, New People's
Army (NPA), Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia
|
ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY
Jemaah
Islamiya (JI) is primarily concerned with the notion of Daulah Islamiyah
Nusantara, which refers to the establishment of a pan-Islamic republic that
incorporates Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Thailand, and the southern
Philippines.
The
history of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) begins with two key individuals, Abdullah
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Both men got their start as part of an Islamist
opposition to Suharto’s rule in Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s.[2] Sungkar
was connected to the older Darul Islam movement that is currently active in
Indonesia but considered fractionalized. In 1972, Ba’aysir and Sungkar
established an Islamic boarding school in Solo known as al Mukmin Pesantren
(Pondok Ngruji) that created a network of Islamists that would contribute to
the formation of JI years later. Among the important individuals who passed
through the doors of al Mukmin were Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali,
and Abu Jibril, both of whom also played a role in the formation of JI.
Ba’aysir and Sungkar were arrested in 1978 and sentenced to nine years in
prison under anti-subversion laws. However, both men served only half of their
sentences and fled to Malaysia in the early 1980s, where they served as
ideologues for violent Islamists headed for Afghanistan. It was during this
phase, when many jihadis were fighting in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet
War, and also retreating to Malaysia to escape the wrath of Suharto, that JI
was conceived.
Prior
to 1993, Ba’aysir and Sungkar instructed their star pupils and deputies,
Hambali and Jibril, to establish a network of militants in Southeast Asia.[3]
On January 1, 1993, Sungkar officially made the transition of JI from a
political organization to a militant, terrorist organization.[4] Sungkar and Ba’aysir returned to Solo,
Indonesia in 1999 after the country’s dictatorship collapsed and democracy was
established.[5] Even though responsible
for such major operations as both Bali bombings, and the 2003 Marriott bombing,
some authorities suggest that JI is beginning to model itself as a less violent
organization. Regardless, other
researchers note that JI no longer has the ability to commit large-scale
attacks on legitimate government or civilian targets. Indonesia and other security forces have
conducted effective counterterrorism operations against group leaders,
including the captures of JI’s operations chief, Hambali; the chief bomb-maker,
Azahari bin Husin; military leader, Zarkasih; military commander, Abu Duhanah;
the Singaporean leader, Mas Selamat Kastari; and finally, the death of the
Jakarta 2009 bombings mastermind, Noordin M. Top. Jemaah Islamiya does, however, have the capacity
to reassert itself as a formidable threat in the future as young, hard-line
Islamists grow into adults and take responsibility for the previous
generation’s struggle.
STRUCTURE
JI
divides organizational responsibilities between regions, each composed of
various committees and sub-committees.
There are currently four specific territorial cells throughout the
region called “Mantiqis” under the control of the Emir (leader) and the Markaz
(leadership council). Each Mantiqi
controls a geographic division across Southeast Asia. Riduan Isamuddin, or Hambali, was allegedly
the operations chief for JI, and a senior lieutenant of al-Qaeda, that acted as
a point of contact between one or more Mantiqis until his arrest in Thailand in
2003. The inner core of JI is made up of
a very tight-knit group of individuals, most of who fought in the Afghan-Soviet
War.
FUNDING
JI
manages its own financing wing, ensuring a steady flow of money to support
their terrorist activities. Businesses
established by JI operatives are required to contribute 10% of their earnings
to the group’s Infaq Fisabilillah (operations fund). Charitable and terrorist
organizations have also been linked to JI, including the Medical Emergency
Relief Charity, Islamic International Relief Organization, al Haramain, and al
Qaeda. Research shows that in a five
year period, al Qaeda donated up to 1.3 billion rupiah (approximately $130,000)
to JI. There is anecdotal evidence that JI members abroad are struggling to
maintain themselves financially, some becoming more involved in the small arms
market in Mindanao to sustain themselves.
Some international criminal enterprises, such as arms trafficking, are
popular among JI operatives. Not only
are they able to raise funds from these activities, but it also adds to their
arsenal of weapons. JI has been known to
conduct extensive robbery and burglary activities in order to fund their
day-to-day activities, in addition to large-scale bombing operations.
RECRUITMENT
The
pesantren (religious school), al-Mukmin, is one of the more popular pesantrens
where Ba’asyir preached his political radical beliefs. Several Jemaah Islamiya
(JI) members and leaders were known to have attended pesantrens within Pondok
Ngruki. It is believed that JI will always find recruits through such
institutions as Islamic boarding and public schools, prisons, and college
campuses.
TACTICS
JI
operatives have become notorious for their extensive bombing campaigns against
Western targets in Southeast Asia. The bombs produced by JI are designed to
cause mass civilian casualties, similar to those of al-Qaeda and other Islamist
groups. Moreover, the group has
primarily targeted Americans, other security forces, or civilians in “soft
areas” that are difficult to protect, such as nightclubs and hotels, as opposed
to more secure installations. The
following three elements have made the group quite successful: (1) tactics designed for mass casualties; (2)
hitting soft targets; (3) and targeting Westerners. JI also targets police and security forces
from both Indonesia, and Australia.
The
organization is responsible for several lethal bombing attacks in Indonesia
against Western targets, including the Bali nightclub bombing in 2002 which
resulted in the deaths of 202 people, the Marriot Hotel bombing in Jakarta in
2003, the vehicle-born IED attack against the Australian embassy in 2004, the
string of tourist site bombings in October 2005 in Bali, and the Marriott and
Ritz-Carlton hotel bombings in July 2009 in Jakarta which killed nine people,
and injured over 50.
